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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09 has left the advanced economies with average levels of gross
government debt breaching 100 percent level of GDP for the ﬁrst time since the aftermath
of World War II, see International Monetary Fund (2011). As a result, the IMF expects
most governments of such economies, except for Japan and the United States, to begin
consolidation eﬀorts by 2012. Politicians in some countries, such as the United Kingdom,
argue that ﬁscal consolidations will ultimately enhance growth, and they cite the need to
avoid rising debt costs as a key motivation in undertaking ﬁscal consolidations. Evidently,
the dominant medium-term ﬁscal trend in advanced economies is a return to a position of
ﬁscal sustainability, particularly when prompted to do so under ﬁnancial market pressure.
Conventional Keynesian analysis suggests that ﬁscal consolidations inevitably contract
aggregate demand and reduce output. Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1990) analysis of ﬁscal con-
solidations in Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s, however, suggests that such ﬁscal actions
could be expansionary, because output growth actually accelerated after these ﬁscal tighten-
ings. Subsequent empirical work considers a wider set of countries over a wider time period
and also ﬁnds some evidence that ﬁscal consolidations can be expansionary.1 It appears
that the persistence and composition of the consolidation often matters, with government
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1Briotti (2005) surveys the literature.
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spending cuts being thought to be pro-growth relative to tax increases (see, for example,
Alesina and Perotti (1995), Perotti (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010), and Ardagna
(2004)).
Theoretical mechanisms underpinning the empirical results have been discussed. In par-
ticular, Bertola and Drazen (1993) develop a model where government spending is inherently
unsustainable, but the government will satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint by peri-
odically cutting spending. These consolidations may occur at a low threshold, but if not,
they will deﬁnitely occur at a second, higher threshold. A worsening ﬁscal position raises
the probability of soon entering a period of beneﬁcial ﬁscal correction and, therefore, can
lead to an expansion.2 While Bertola and Drazen (1993) is often cited as an example of the
importance of expectations when considering the impact of ﬁscal consolidations, it cannot
address questions relating to the composition of consolidations, which the empirical litera-
ture often ﬁnds important. Our analysis begins by adding distorting taxes to Bertola and
Drazen’s (1993) model to highlight how uncertainty over the timing and the composition of
ﬁscal compositions can aﬀect whether or not a realized consolidation is expansionary.
Following this simple example, we develop a non-linear DSGE model, in which ﬁscal con-
solidations may occur with an increasing probability as government debt levels rise, but the
exact timing is uncertain. It is consistent with the empirical observation that sizeable con-
solidations can take place at low- as well as high-debt levels. We also introduce uncertainty
over the composition of ﬁscal consolidation, either tax- or spending-based, building on the
dataset by Alesina and Ardagna (2010). We ﬁnd that the nature of ﬁscal consolidation, its
duration, the expectations over its likelihood and composition, the monetary policy stance,
and the level of government debt all matter in determining the extent to which a given
consolidation is expansionary and/or successful in stabilizing government debt. When debt
levels are high, the inﬂationary consequences of alternative ﬁscal instruments, conditional
on the stance of monetary policy, are particularly important in determining the impact of
alternative forms of ﬁscal consolidation. For example, when economic agents anticipate tax
increases under an imminent ﬁscal consolidation package, they will suﬀer the ill-eﬀects of
distortionary taxation, including higher inﬂation and, when monetary policy is active, higher
debt service costs, even if the realized consolidation is ultimately spending based. As a result,
the resolution of the uncertainty associated with the composition or the timing can have a
signiﬁcant impact on the nature of the marginal economic response to the consolidation.
Such non-linear interactions among debt levels, the monetary policy stance, the composi-
2Similarly, Sutherland (1997) suggests that there will be non-linearities in the economic impact of ﬁscal
policy when debt levels aﬀect the timing of ﬁscal consolidations in an overlapping generations economy.
Alesina and Perotti (1997) also argue that the response to changes in tax rates may be quite diﬀerent
depending on the extent and nature of union wage bargaining.
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tions of consolidations, and the expectations about the nature of consolidations are unlikely
to be controlled for by adding individual variables to linear regressions or by sorting samples
conditional on a single variable. This may explain why the empirical literature does not
always fully agree on the relative importance of diﬀerent factors in determining whether or
not a consolidation is expansionary and/or successful. In many cases, one study ﬁnds a
conditioning variable to be signiﬁcant, while another study does not.3
The next section discusses empirical evidence in Alesina and Ardagna (2010), who analyze
the large-scale ﬁscal consolidations within OECD countries between 1970 and 2007. Section
3 lays out a simple economy where uncertainty over the timing and the composition of
ﬁscal consolidations can be expansionary in a neoclassical setting. Section 4 outlines the
richer new Keynesian model and the range of state-dependent ﬁscal consolidations that may
occur. Section 5 describes the ﬁscal limit that determines the state-dependent probability
of observing a ﬁscal consolidation and section 6 describes the calibration and solution for
the non-linear model. Sections 7 and 8 present the model’s implications for a wide range of
ﬁscal consolidations. Section 9 concludes.
2 Fiscal Consolidations Data
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) (henceforth AA) analyze episodes of ﬁscal stimulus (rise in
deﬁcit/fall in surplus) and consolidation (fall in deﬁcit/rise in surplus) of more than 1.5
percent of GDP, where the data are cyclically adjusted. They classify a episode as “expan-
sionary” if GDP growth in the two years following the stimulus/consolidation is greater than
the 75th percentile of the empirical density in all episodes. They also deﬁne a “successful”
ﬁscal consolidation as one that reduces the debt-GDP ratio by 4.5 percent three years later.
Based on a sample of developed economies between 1970 and 2007, 107 episodes are ﬁscal
consolidations, which is 15.1 percent of the observations.
We follow AA to compute the average change in key ﬁscal variables in the two years fol-
lowing a ﬁscal consolidation relative to the two years prior to the adjustment. Our numbers
diﬀer slightly from those in AA as we exclude consolidations where we do not have observa-
tions either before or after the episode.4 Table 1 details the average change in ﬁscal variables
under both types of consolidation, where all variables are measured relative to output. It re-
veals some striking diﬀerences between “expansionary” and “contractionary” consolidations
3For example, Lambertini and Tavares (2005) ﬁnd that accompanying exchange rate devaluations help en-
sure ﬁscal consolidations are successful, but Ardagna (2004) does not; and while Alesina and Ardagna (2010)
ﬁnd that the composition of consolidations aﬀects both how expansionary and successful a consolidation is,
Ardagna (2004) argues that composition does not matter for success.
4We do this because we wish to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of the changes in ﬁscal variables over
the course of a consolidation episode.
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that meet AA’s deﬁnitions. “Expansionary” consolidations feature a statistically signiﬁcant
fall in government spending of 2.19 percent of GDP, and a statistically insigniﬁcant rise in
tax revenues of 0.35 percent and fall in transfers of 0.58 percent of GDP. In contrast, con-
tractionary consolidations entail a fall in government spending of only 0.8 percent, and rises
in tax revenues of 1.11 percent and in transfers of 0.47 percent, all of which are statistically
signiﬁcant.
The “expansionary” ﬁscal consolidations appear to be driven by spending cuts with no
signiﬁcant increases in aggregate tax revenues, while the “contractionary” episodes are far
more heavily dependent on increases in taxation. AA also observe that one out of four ﬁscal
consolidations are “expansionary”, and that out of 107 ﬁscal consolidations, 65 last for one
year, 13 last two years, 4 last three years and 1 lasts for four years. We use these observations
to calibrate both the consolidation duration and the relative frequency of spending- and tax-
based consolidations in the following sections.
3 Simple Model of Fiscal Consolidation
In this section we use a small, open economy to highlight the role expectations may play in
determining whether or not a ﬁscal consolidation is expansionary. We augment Bertola and
Drazen’s (1993) model with distortionary taxation. The small, open economy assumption
allows us to generate analytical results in an endowment economy in which households still
face meaningful consumption/saving decisions. Uncertainty over both the composition and
the timing of ﬁscal consolidations generate expectation eﬀects that have implications for the
existence of expansionary consolidations.
A representative household maximizes utility according to,
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsc2t+s (1)
s.t. βat+1 = at + y(1− τt − ψ(τt)2)− ct (2)
where y is the household’s endowment income. The holdings of ﬁnancial assets at the start of
period (at) earn a world interest rate of 1/β. τt is the tax rate on endowment income, which
carries deadweight losses of yψ(τt)
2. Deadweight losses can be motivated by tax avoidance
activities in an environment where the ﬁscal authorities ﬁnd it diﬃcult to measure the
household’s income, but more generally they capture the costs of distortionary taxation in
economies with a more sophisticated supply side.5 The household’s intertemporal budget
5In the New Keynesian DSGE model we consider below, other than the standard mechanism of taxes dis-
torting labor supply decisions, sticky prices imply additional distortions caused by the inﬂation consequences
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constraint is,
∞∑
s=0
βsEtct+s = at + Et
∞∑
s=0
βsy(1− τt+s − ψ(τt+s)2) (3)
With quadratic utility, the household’s ﬁrst-order condition delivers pure consumption
smoothing,
ct = Etct+s (4)
Only surprises in the either the composition or the timing of ﬁscal consolidations give rise
to jumps in consumption, while anticipated cuts in government spending and/or tax rises
aﬀect consumption only at the time when they are news.
The government’s ﬂow budget constraint is,
βbt+1 = bt − yτt + gt (5)
implying the intertemporal constraint
bt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βsyτt+s −Et
∞∑
s=0
βsgt+s (6)
Imposing equilibrium—equations (4) and (6)—the household’s intertemporal budget con-
straint implies,
ct
1− β = (at − bt) + Et
∞∑
s=0
βsy(1− ψ(τt+s)2)− Et
∞∑
s=0
βsgt+s (7)
where at − bt are the net foreign assets held by households. At time t, the right side of
equation (7) is predetermined or exogenous to the household, so we can use this expression
to consider the impact on consumption of alternative compositions and timings of ﬁscal
consolidations.
Assume the initial levels of government spending, g0, and tax rates, τ 0, are insuﬃcient to
satisfy the government’s intertemporal constraint, (6), then debt is increasing and govern-
ment spending or taxes must change in the future for the debt to have value in equilibrium.
After n periods, debt reaches a level bt+n, found by accumulating the government’s ﬂow
budget constraint forwards n periods.
bt+n = β
−nbt − β−n
n−1∑
s=0
βsyτ 0 + β−n
n−1∑
s=0
βsg0 (8)
of changes in distortionary taxation.
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We now consider two types of uncertainty: uncertainty in the timing of the ﬁscal consolida-
tion and uncertainty in the composition.
3.1 The Timing of Consolidations In this model, there is only one channel through
which the timing of ﬁscal consolidations can aﬀect the likelihood of an expansionary con-
solidation: the non-linearities associated with the deadweight losses caused by distortionary
taxation. To satisfy the government’s budget constraint, some combination of spending cuts
or tax increases must be implemented to stabilize debt. In the absence of deadweight losses,
the timing of these tax and expenditure changes cannot matter—unexpected delays in ﬁscal
consolidation would have no eﬀect, so long as ﬁscal policy ultimately satisﬁes the intertem-
poral budget constraint. In the presence of deadweight losses, however, the discounted value
of these losses erode the resources available to the household for consumption. To the extent
that a tax-based consolidation is delayed, the required tax increase rises, and the deadweight
losses associated with the consolidation rise even faster.
Consider the household’s consumption decision, equation (7), when only taxes adjust to
stabilize debt. Using bt − g0/(1 − β) = Et
∑
s β
syτt+s from equation (6), the consumption
decision becomes,
ct
1− β = at + Et
∞∑
s=0
βsy(1− τt+s − ψ(τt+s)2) (9)
Altering the timing of a tax-based consolidation does not aﬀect the size of the discounted
tax revenues needed to maintain ﬁscal solvency, but does aﬀect the expected discounted sum
of the deadweight losses,
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsy(ψ(τt+s)
2) (10)
From familiar tax smoothing arguments, the discounted sum of these deadweight losses
is minimized by an immediate one-oﬀ increase in the tax rate to a level suﬃcient to satisfy
the government’s budget. Any delay in the implementation of the consolidation deviates
from tax smoothing and raises the discounted value of deadweight losses. Accordingly,
unexpected delay in a tax-based consolidation reduces consumption, while an unexpectedly
prompt consolidation increases it.
3.2 Composition Uncertainty To model composition uncertainty, assume that house-
holds expect a ﬁscal consolidation n periods from now, with ﬁscal policy changing taxes or
government spending to new levels that satisfy (6) at period t + n. Households expect the
consolidation to be spending-based with probability q, and tax-based with probability 1− q.
To stabilize debt at bt+n, a spending-based consolidation sets g
1 from period t + n onwards
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to satisfy,
g1 = yτ 0 − (1− β)bt+n (11)
where tax rates remain at τ 0. In the case of a tax-based consolidation, the new tax rate, τ 1
solves,
yτ 1 = g0 + (1− β)bt+n (12)
Government-spending based consolidation requires a cut in spending and a tax-based con-
solidation requires an increase in tax revenues of an equal amount to ensure that debt is
stabilized at the level bt+n from that point onwards. Consumption under each type of con-
solidation, from period t+ n onwards is,
ctax = (1− β)(at+n − bt+n) + y(1− ψ(τ 1)2)− g0 (13)
cspending = (1− β)(at+n − bt+n) + y(1− ψ(τ 0)2)− g1 (14)
Before consolidation, consumption lies between these two cases, so that there will be a
positive (negative) jump in consumption at the point when the consolidation is revealed to
be spending- (tax-) based. The exact size of the jump depends on expectations prior to the
realization of the consolidation. Consumption prior to the consolidation is,
c0 = (1− β)(at − bt) + (1− β)
n−1∑
s=0
βsy(1− ψ(τ 0)2)− (1− β)
n−1∑
s=0
βsg0
+βn(qy(1− ψ(τ 0)2 + (1− q)y(1− ψ(τ 1)2)− βn(qg1 + (1− q)g0)
= (1− β)(at − bt) + y(1− ψ(τ 0)2)− g0
−βn((1− q)y(ψ(τ 1)2 − ψ(τ 0)2) + βn(q(g0 − g1) (15)
Pre-consolidation consumption takes account of the accumulation of government debt in
the n periods before consolidation and also attaches probability weights to the types of
consolidation that will ultimately emerge. The current consumption gain (loss) from an
anticipated government spending- (tax-) based consolidation is clear. These expectations
drive current consumption and, therefore, current saving behavior: to the extent that agents
anticipate a future cut in government spending, current consumption will rise; if they fear
a future rise in taxes, current consumption will fall. While the magnitude of the realized
spending cuts or tax increases is unaﬀected by the these expectations—since they do not
aﬀect debt dynamics prior to the consolidation—the accumulation of net foreign assets is
aﬀected. Combining the government’s and households’ ﬂow budget constraints, prior to the
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ﬁscal consolidation, net foreign assets evolve according to,
β(at+1 − bt+1) = at − bt + y(1− ψ(τ 0)2)− c0 − g0 (16)
Substituting for the pre-consolidation level of consumption yields,
(at+1 − bt+1)− (at − bt) = βn−1[(1− q)yψ((τ 1)2 − (τ 0)2 − q(g0 − g1)] (17)
and the accumulated change in net foreign assets between t and t+ n is,
(at+n − bt+n)− (at − bt) = βn−1
n−1∑
s=0
[(1− q)yψ((τ 1)2 − (τ 0)2 − q(g0 − g1)] (18)
When the expected deadweight losses from the tax increase, (1 − q)yψ((τ 1)2 − (τ 0)2, are
greater than the expected cut in government spending, q(g0 − g1), households accumulate
net foreign assets in anticipation of the deadweight losses to come. Since these expectations
are formed over the relative probabilities of each type of consolidation, households will ac-
cumulate more (less) net foreign assets when they anticipate that the consolidation will be
tax (spending)-based.
When a spending-based consolidation is realized, the jump in consumption is
cspending − c0 = (1− β)((at+n − bt+n)− (at − bt)) + g0 − g1 (19)
+βn((1− q)y(ψ(τ 1)2 − ψ(τ 0)2)− q(g0 − g1))
which will exceed the cut in government expenditure and be classed as expansionary when-
ever
cspending − c0 > g0 − g1 (20)
This requires,
βn−1[(1− q)y(ψ(τ 1)2 − ψ(τ 0)2)− q(g0 − g1)] > 0 (21)
Condition (21) implies an expansionary outcome upon the realization of a spending-based
consolidation whenever,
(1− q)y(ψ(τ 1)2 − ψ(τ 0)2) > q(g0 − g1) (22)
Condition (22) requires the expected size of tax distortions (not the tax revenues themselves)
to exceed the expected size of the government expenditure cut, which reﬂect economic agents’
views about the relative probability of each type of consolidation. Any delay in consolidation
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raises the required increases in tax revenues or cuts in expenditure because we are assuming
that the government’s ﬁnances are on an unsustainable path initially. Since the deadweight
losses are non-linearly increasing in the tax rate, the deadweight losses associated with tax
increases will be rising faster than the equivalent cuts in expenditure.
To conclude, ﬁscal consolidations are more likely to be expansionary when they have been
long delayed, and when economic agents were expecting them to be tax-based with high
deadweight loss but the realized consolidation is spending-based. Conversely, the biggest
consumption declines from consolidation occur when the consolidation is tax-based and eco-
nomic agents were expecting cuts in government spending. We explore the quantitative
importance of uncertainty over the timing and composition of ﬁscal consolidations in a fully-
ﬂedged DSGE model below. Our experiments will diﬀer from this simple example in a crucial
respect: in line with the data, we consider temporary consolidations rather than permanent
ones.
4 Quantitative Model of Fiscal Consolidation
We now turn to study the macroeconomic consequences of uncertain ﬁscal consolidations in
a richer and more plausible environment. Since debt service costs are particularly important
in determining debt dynamics at high debt levels, we consciously use a conventional new
Keynesian model of the kind typically used to explore monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions,
modiﬁed by allowing occasional ﬁscal consolidations. The consolidations are triggered after
debt rises to a level that breaches a stochastic “ﬁscal limit.” The ﬁscal limit is the maximum
level of debt the government is able to support, which is constrained by tax Laﬀer curve
and the realizations of shocks. Households anticipate that the government will attempt to
stabilize debt through ﬁscal consolidations in advance of reaching this limit. Political factors
such as a war of attrition over who bears the costs of a particular consolidation, however,
may induce the government to leave consolidation to the last minute.6 In accord with this
evidence, the probability of a ﬁscal consolidation in the model rises with the government
debt-GDP ratio.
We also allow periodically explosive lump-sum transfers. Aside from being a feature of
the data, temporarily explosive transfers allows for plausible transition from relatively low
to very high debt levels. This assumption also changes the distribution of ﬁscal limits and,
therefore, the likelihood of ﬁscal consolidation at a given debt level. Bi (2011) shows that
possible explosive transfers can signiﬁcantly lower expected future ﬁscal surpluses, which
generates a more dispersed distribution of ﬁscal limits and makes it more likely the economy
6Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) ﬁnd that political factors play a signiﬁcant role in determining
when a consolidation is instigated, consistent with war-of-attrition eﬀects.
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will hit its ﬁscal limit at low levels of debt.
Households in our economy supply labor to intermediate goods producing ﬁrms with
Rotemberg-style price adjustment. Their labor and proﬁt income are taxed. The setup
delivers a rich set of monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions. Monetary policy has real eﬀects
due to the price stickiness, which aﬀects both the size of the tax base and real debt service
costs. Fiscal policy, in the form of tax or government spending changes, not only has the usual
ﬁscal consequences, but also inﬂuences inﬂation either through the labor supply response to
distortionary taxation or the aggregate demand eﬀect of changes in government spending.
As a result, there will be resource costs resulting from the inﬂationary consequences of ﬁscal
consolidations so that the distortions governing the calculus of consolidations go beyond the
usual deadweight losses of distortionary taxation.
4.1 Households The cashless economy is populated by a large number of identical house-
holds of size 1, who have preferences given by,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the households’ subjective discount factor, ct is consumption and nt the
households’ labor supply. The household receives nominal wages (Wt) and monopoly proﬁts
(Υt) from the ﬁrm, both of which are taxed at the rate τt, and lump-sum transfers (zt) from
the government. The household chooses consumption, hours worked, and nominal bond
holdings (Bt) to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint,
Ptct +
Bt
Rt
= Bt−1 + (1− τt) (Wtnt + PtΥt) + Ptzt (23)
The maximization problem yields the typical ﬁrst-order conditions,
1
Rt
= βEt
uc(t + 1)
uc(t)
1
πt+1
(24)
−un(t)
uc(t)
= wt (1− τt) (25)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the inﬂation rate and wt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real wage. Labor income is
taxed so that changes in the tax rate will inﬂuence households’ desire to work.
4.2 Final Goods Production Final goods production is for the purposes of private and
public consumption. Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms buy the diﬀerentiated products produced
by intermediate goods producers to construct consumption aggregates, which have the usual
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CES form,
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
(26)
where yt is aggregate output, yt(i) the output of intermediate good ﬁrm i, and θ > 1 is the
elasticity of demand for each ﬁrm’s product. The cost minimization for ﬁnal goods producers
results in the demand curve for intermediate good i,
yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
yt (27)
and an associated price index for ﬁnal goods,
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
(28)
4.3 Intermediate Goods Production The imperfectly competitive intermediate goods
ﬁrms are subject to Rotemberg adjustment costs that penalize large price changes in excess
of steady-state inﬂation rates. Price adjustment costs render the ﬁrm’s problem dynamic,
max
∞∑
t=0
R0,t
(
pt(i)yt(i)−mctPtyt(i)− φ
2
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
1
π
− 1
)2
Ptyt
)
(29)
s.t. yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
yt (30)
where mct = wt/At is the real marginal cost implied by a linear production function, yt(i) =
Atnt(i). Productivity (At) is common to all ﬁrms. The ﬁrst-order condition, after imposing
symmetry across ﬁrms, is,
(1− θ) + θmct − φ
(πt
π
− 1
) πt
π
+ βφEt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
(πt+1
π
− 1
) πt+1
π
yt+1
yt
= 0
which represents the non-linear new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) under Rotemberg
pricing. It would, upon linearization, correspond to the standard NKPC under Calvo (1983)
pricing.
The associated monopoly proﬁt, which is taxed by the government when received by
households, is,
Υt = yt −mctYt − φ
2
(πt
π
− 1
)2
yt (31)
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The aggregate resource constraint is,
ct + gt = Atnt
(
1− φ
2
(πt
π
− 1
)2)
4.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy The government budget constraint is,
Bt
Rt
+ τt (Wtnt + PtΥt) = Bt−1 + Ptgt + Ptzt (32)
While ﬁscal policy in the form of tax, transfers and government spending changes will ob-
viously aﬀect debt dynamics, monetary policy will also have a role to play, especially when
debt stocks are large.
Monetary policy follows a simple inﬂation-targeting rule,
Rt − R = α(πt − π) (33)
where π is the target inﬂation rate. In a deterministic steady state, Rt = R and πt = π.
Before considering consolidation episodes, we describe ﬁscal policy variables during nor-
mal times, when no consolidation is underway. Fiscal transfers evolve exogenously, but their
process depends on a regime-switching index rszt ,
z(rszt ) =
{
(1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + εzt if rszt = 1 (ρz < 1)
ζzzt−1 + εzt if rs
z
t = 2 (ζ
z > 1)
with εzt ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2z) and rszt following a transition matrix of
(
pz1 1− pz1
1− pz2 pz2
)
.
The Markov regime-switching process moves from a stationary process with ρz < 1 to
one where transfers explode with ζz > 1. There can be prolonged periods during which
transfer increases leading to sustained increases in government debt, which can prompt at-
tempts at ﬁscal consolidation. Periodic instability in transfers is common to many advanced
economies and, as the International Monetary Fund (2009) reports, are likely to become
more widespread as populations age.
In normal times, government spending follows an AR(1) process,
gt − g = ρg(gt−1 − g) + εgt εgt ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2g) (34)
and tax rates adjust to stabilize government debt with γτ > 0,
τt − τ = γτ (bt−1 − b) + ετt (35)
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5 Fiscal Limit and Fiscal Consolidation
This section describes the computation of the model’s ﬁscal limit, which forms the basis for
the government’s timing of undertaking a ﬁscal consolidation.
5.1 Distribution of the Fiscal Limit Laﬀer curves provide a natural starting point
for quantifying the ﬁscal limit from the tax revenue side of the government’s budget con-
straint. At the peak of the Laﬀer curve, tax revenues reach their maximum and, for a given
level of total government expenditures, the present value of primary surpluses is maximized.
Revenues, expenditures, and discount rates, of course, vary with the shocks hitting the econ-
omy, generating a distribution for the maximum debt-GDP level that can be supported.
This produces the distribution of the ﬁscal limit.
To compute the ﬁscal limit, we assume that the monetary authority keeps the inﬂation
rate at its target (πt = π), so the peak of the Laﬀer curve is a function of the exogenous
state of the economy (At, gt).
τmaxt = τ
max(At, gt) (36)
Tmaxt = T max(At, gt) (37)
where the function τmax (T max) maps the state into the tax rate (revenues) at the peak.
Evidently, the stochastic processes governing the exogenous states induce stochastic processes
for both the tax rate that maximizes revenues and the maximum level of revenues.
The ﬁscal limit is deﬁned, following Bi (2011), as the discounted sum of expected maxi-
mum primary surpluses in all future periods.
B∗ = E
∞∑
t=0
βt βp︸︷︷︸
political factor
umaxc (At, gt)
umaxc (A0, g0)
(T max(At, gt, zt, rszt )− gt − zt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
smaxt
(38)
The stochastic discount factor is obtained when tax rates are at the peak of the Laﬀer
curve, βtumaxc (At, gt)/u
max
c (A0, g0), but modiﬁed to allow for a political risk parameter βp.
Higher political risk—lower βp—lends itself to multiple interpretations that reﬂect the pri-
vate sector’s beliefs about policy. Most straightforward is the idea that policymakers have
eﬀectively shorter planning horizons than the private sector, see Acemoglu, Golosov, and
Tsyvinski (2008). To see this, rewrite the discount factor in (38) as (βpβ)
t/(βp)
t−1, so that
a lower value of βp reduces the present value of maximum surpluses. An alternative inter-
pretation is that implies that private agents place probability mass on both the maximum
surpluses (smax) and on zero primary surpluses. Rewrite the surpluses as βps
max+(1−βp) ·0
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for this interpretation. Nothing we do hinges on the precise interpretation attached to βp.
As a practical matter, setting βp < 1 serves to shift down the distribution of the ﬁscal
limit, which generates occurrences of ﬁscal consolidations at lower levels of debt similar to
those observed in the data. Moreover, as discussed in section 4, the possibility of temporar-
ily explosive transfers leads to a wider dispersion of the ﬁscal limit, which also creates the
possibility of consolidations at relatively low debt levels.
Since there exists a unique mapping between the exogenous state space, (At, gt, zt, rs
z
t ),
and τmaxt and T
max
t , the unconditional distribution of the ﬁscal limit, f(B∗), can be derived
from a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation following the steps in appendix A.
5.2 Fiscal Policy During Consolidations We modify the government spending
process and the tax rule as,
gt − g = −mgt + ρg(gt−1 − g) (39)
τt − τ = mτt + γτ (bt−1 − b) (40)
Fiscal consolidations take the form non-zero values for the intercept terms mgt and m
τ
t ,
implying reductions in government spending and increases in taxation.
At each period t, the eﬀective ﬁscal limit (b∗t ) is drawn from the distribution of the ﬁscal
limit. We treat the choice of b∗t as random, being driven by policymakers’ perceived costs of
ﬁscal consolidation. If the existing debt level (bt−1) surpasses the eﬀective ﬁscal limit, the
government undertakes a consolidation that lasts for four periods—in line with AA’s data—
either through raising the tax rate (with probability ω) or cutting government purchases
(with probability 1−ω); otherwise, the government follows the usual ﬁscal policy rules that
set mτt = m
g
t = 0.
A state variable rst tracks the path of ﬁscal consolidations: it equals 1 in normal times; if
the government undertakes a tax-based consolidation, rst switches to 2 and the consolidation
lasts for another 3 periods, so rst+1 = 3, rst+2 = 4, rst+3 = 5, before returning to the normal
no-consolidation state; if the government undertakes a spending-based consolidation at t
that lasts 4 periods, rst = 6, rst+1 = 7, rst+2 = 8, rst+3 = 9, before exiting.
7 These policy
dynamics are summarized by,
7After a consolidation, policy stays in the no-consolidation state for at least one period before another
consolidation can occur.
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
if bt−1 < b∗t : no consolidation (rst = 1, m
τ
t = m
g
t = 0)
otherwise, with prob of ω: tax-based consolidation (rst . . . rst+3 = 2, . . . , 5)
(mτt = m
τ , mgt = 0)
with prob of 1− ω: spending-based consolidation (rst . . . rst+3 = 6, . . . , 9)
(mτt = 0, m
g
t = m
g)
Even though the households know the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, the timing and the
composition of consolidation are uncertain.
6 Calibration and Solution
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency to EU-14 data. We focus on those economies
because they feature heavily in the AA dataset, both in terms of undertaking the sizeable
ﬁscal consolidations and of occasionally enjoying consolidations that AA labelled as “expan-
sionary.”
We calibrate ﬁscal parameters to match average EU-14 data from 1971 to 2007.8 In steady
state, government purchases are 21 percent of GDP, lump-sum transfers are 18 percent of
GDP, and the tax rate is 0.41, implying a steady-state government debt–GDP ratio of 50.38
percent. The tax adjustment parameter (γ) is calibrated to 0.5 at an annual rate, which is
close to the average of estimates in EU-14. The regime-switching parameters pz1 and p
z
2 are
calibrated to 0.975, so that the average length of each regime is 10 years. A higher pz leads
to a more dispersed distribution of ﬁscal limits. ζz is set at 1.003, implying an increase of
12.75 percent in transfers in 10 years. The shock processes for zt and gt are estimated using
linearly detrended data, as summarized in Table 2.
As discussed in section 2, the length of consolidations is calibrated to one year, while the
size of consolidations, the mτ and mg terms, are calibrated to 1 percent of the steady-state
level of GDP. The International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) index of political risk oﬀers
one way to calibrate the political factor (βp), see Arteta and Galina (2008). The average
ICRG index of EU-14 was 85 out of 100 during the period of 1984-2009.
The household discount rate is 0.99 and the net real interest rate is 4.04 percent at annual
rate. The utility function is u(c, n) = log c+χn log(1−n). The leisure preference parameter
(χn) is calibrated so that the household spends 25 percent of its time working at the steady
state and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 3. Time endowment and the productivity
level at the steady state are normalized to 1. Productivity remains at the steady state.9 The
price elasticity of demand (θ) is assumed to be 11 and the Rotemberg adjustment parameter
8Appendix B describes the data.
9Stochastic productivity signiﬁcantly increases the computational time but does not change the results.
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(φ) is 100, which is equivalent to Calvo-type overlapping contracts models where 26.7 percent
of the ﬁrms reoptimize each quarter, see Keen and Wang (2007). The gross inﬂation rate is
calibrated to 1.03 at annual rate and the Taylor rule parameter is assumed to be 1.5 in the
benchmark case.
Under this calibration, the distribution of the ﬁscal limit can be simulated by drawing
from the distributions of the exogenous shocks. Figure 1 reports the kernel-estimated cu-
mulative distribution of the ﬁscal limit. Along an equilibrium path, as the debt rises, so
too does the probability that debt will exceed the eﬀective ﬁscal limit, b∗t , drawn from the
distribution in the ﬁgure. The fat tail is generated by the possibility of entering the explosive
transfers regime.
We solve the full non-linear model laid out in section 4, coupled with the ﬁscal limit
described in section 5, using the monotone map method. The solution method, based on
Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), discretizes the state space and conjectures candidate
decision rules that reduce the system to a set of ﬁrst-order expectational diﬀerence equations.
Decision rules map the state at period t into the stock of government debt, the real wage, and
the inﬂation rate in the same period. Given the state denoted as ψt = {bt−1, gt, zt, τt, rst, rszt},
the mappings can be written as bt = f
b(ψt), wt = f
w(ψt), πt = f
π(ψt). After ﬁnding the
decision rules, we solve for the bond-pricing rule, qt = f
q(ψt), using the government budget
constraint. The interest rate on government bonds can also be solved using Rt = 1/qt,
denoted as fR(ψt). Appendix C describes the nonlinear solution method.
7 Fiscal Consolidation: Time Uncertainty Only
As section 2 describes, ﬁscal consolidations can occur across a wide range of debt-GDP
ratios, but it is reasonable to posit that the probability of a ﬁscal consolidation is rising in
the debt-GDP ratio. Consolidations at low debt levels are more likely to be something of a
surprise, than the consolidations following sustained increases in debt. We focus initially on
uncertainty over the timing and duration of consolidations.
7.1 Tax-Based Fiscal Consolidation Tax-based consolidations, labelled as rsτt , are
speciﬁed as,
rsτ : τt − τ = mτ (rst) + γτ (bt−1 − b)
Fiscal consolidation measurement (mτ ) depends on the state-dependent variable rst, which
in turn hinges on equilibrium government liabilities bt−1 and the stochastic ﬁscal limit b∗t .
With consolidations lasting four periods, the regime change is governed by,
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{
if bt−1 < b∗t : rst = 1;m
τ
t = 0
otherwise: rst . . . rst+3 = 2, . . . , 5; m
τ
t = m
τ
If government debt exceeds the stochastic ﬁscal limit, b∗t , it implements a consolidation
for one year by raising taxes beyond the level implied by the usual ﬁscal rule in an attempt to
reduce government debt. To draw out the role of expectations, we contrast rsτ consolidations
to the same-sized consolidations implemented through a sequence of unanticipated i.i.d.
policy shocks ετt , labeled as “no-RS”.
no− RS : τt − τ = γτ (bt−1 − b) + ετt
Expectations play a central role in determining the macroeconomic impacts of consolida-
tion. When consolidation entails a regime switch, agents know the new policy rules remain
in eﬀect for four periods and, therefore, adjust their expectations accordingly. A sequence
of surprise policies, however, has no eﬀect on decision rules. Figure 2 compares the impulse
responses from the no-RS (dotted lines) and the rsτ (solid lines) cases when the initial ex-
pected probability of ﬁscal consolidation is only 0.08. The ﬁgure plots macro variables, the
diﬀerence in the outcome under a ﬁscal consolidation relative to that without consolidation,
as percentage of the steady-state level. With a low probability, the consolidation comes as a
surprise in both cases.
In the rsτ case, once the ﬁscal consolidation begins, economic agents know that taxes
will remain high for four quarters, raising real wages and marginal costs. Firms raise prices
in anticipation of this sustained rise in marginal costs; inﬂation jumps up and gradually
declines over the course of the consolidation. While the initial jump helps deﬂate the real
value of government debt, the active monetary policy raises real interest rates in response to
the rise in inﬂation, oﬀsetting some of the debt reduction. In the no-RS case, consolidations
arrive as i.i.d. shocks. Price-setters are repeatedly surprised by the sustained increase in
marginal costs and inﬂation. Active monetary policy does not raise real interest rates by as
much and the repeated inﬂation surprises drive a wedge between ex-ante and ex-post real
interest rates, making the consolidation more eﬀective in stabilizing debt. The uncertainty
over the duration of ﬁscal consolidations may aﬀect their likelihood of success.
A more interesting channel for expectations arises from the likelihood of consolidations.
The probability of a regime-change consolidation is small at low-debt levels, and if a con-
solidation does occur, it surprises agents. At high levels of debt, on the other hand, a
consolidation is to some extent anticipated. Such expectations aﬀect economic behavior in
the pre-consolidation periods, and the consolidation itself can have relatively small eﬀects
when it is actually realized.
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Figure 3 repeats the same experiment as in ﬁgure 2 but with the debt-GDP ratio at 160
percent, which raises the probability of ﬁscal consolidation to 0.82. When a consolidation
is expected but has not yet arrived, it generates negative inﬂation surprises, which worsen
debt dynamics under an active monetary policy. As a result, when the ﬁscal consolidation is
realized, its relative impact is not as great as it would have been if the consolidation had been
unanticipated. But the marginal impact on debt is now reversed: removing the uncertainty
of the consolidation duration removes the large negative inﬂation surprises coming with the
no consolidation base case. Since these surprises are acting on a very large stock of debt,
removing the uncertainty facilitates stabilizing debt. This reverse highlights the importance
of expectations over the likelihood and duration of ﬁscal consolidations.
To understand inﬂation dynamics and the nature of the surprises induced by ﬁscal con-
solidations, we plot the level of inﬂation and expected inﬂation in ﬁgure 4 when the initial
debt is low or high. The inﬂation rate (dotted-circle) and one-step-ahead expected inﬂation
Et−1πt (dashed-circle) are plotted in the top panel of ﬁgure 4, in which the debt jumps to
80 percent of GDP at t = 5 and the probability of consolidation climbs to 0.08, but no ﬁscal
consolidation ever occurs. The tax rate rises with the jump in debt level, raising marginal
costs and inﬂation. As the debt is gradually stabilized over time, tax rates fall and inﬂation
returns to its steady-state value. The triangle lines show the paths of πt and Et−1πt when
a ﬁscal consolidation does occur at t = 9. The tax rate rises, labor supply contracts and
consumption falls. Higher marginal costs further raise inﬂation and, since the consolidation
was unexpected, there is an inﬂation surprise in the ﬁrst period of the consolidation.
If the debt jumps to 120 percent of GDP at t = 5 and the probability of ﬁscal consolidation
rises to 0.82, shown in the bottom panel, inﬂationary expectations rise signiﬁcantly after the
debt rises, even if no actual consolidation takes place. Actual inﬂation, on the other hand,
mimics the path in the top panel. When consolidation does occur at t = 9, taxes and
inﬂation rise, creating a positive inﬂation surprise. There is no inﬂation surprise during the
consolidation or in the period immediately following the exit, as economic agents know that
there will be no further ﬁscal consolidation for at least one period. In all other periods, there
is a non-zero probability attached to consolidation, creating an ongoing inﬂation surprise.
7.2 Spending-Based Fiscal Consolidations We now consider government spending-
based consolidations (rsg), which are speciﬁed as,
rsg : gt − g = −mg(rst) (41)
When government debt exceeds the stochastic ﬁscal limit, b∗t , the government cuts its spend-
ing by mg(rst) for one year. We contrast this rs
g model with the same-sized consolidations
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implemented through a sequence of unanticipated i.i.d. policy shocks (which we label the
no-RS model),
no− RS : gt − g = εgt
Figure 5 compares the impulse responses from no-RS and rsg models when the expected
probability of ﬁscal consolidation is low. Once a consolidation begins, price-setters expect
it to last for a year in rsg model, and inﬂation falls immediately and then slowly returns to
base. With an active monetary policy, a lower inﬂation leads to lower real interest rates,
which helps to reduce debt service costs and maintain the size of the tax base. In contrast,
in the no-RS model, during the consolidation price-setters fail to anticipate the subsequent
decreases in government spending and inﬂation doesn’t fall by as much on impact.
Uncertainty over the duration of a spending-based consolidation reduces its deﬂationary
consequences, contrasting with tax-based consolidations, where the duration uncertainty was
less inﬂationary and raised debt service costs by less.
Figure 6 considers the same experiments except that the probability of consolidation
is high. In the rsg model, economic agents anticipate that government spending cuts are
imminent, and the no-consolidation base case contains positive inﬂation surprises as consoli-
dations are expected but not realized. Outcomes are quite similar to those under lower debt
levels. One noticeable diﬀerence is that there is a smaller increase in consumption when
the consolidation is realized, as households were already expecting government spending to
be cut. Similarly, the initial deﬂation is smaller as it was already factored into inﬂation
expectations.10
7.3 Key Message of Time Uncertainty Output multipliers are a convenient way to
summarize diﬀerences across the no-RS, rsτ and rsg policy scenarios. The multipliers are
computed as,
Multiplier Γyt+k =
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
) (
yshockt+j − ynot+j
)
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
)
(xshockt+j )
(42)
where rt is the real interest rate, and x denotes the type of ﬁscal adjustment: xt = τty for tax-
based and = −gt for spending-based consolidations. It measures the discounted percentage
change in cumulative output for one discounted unit of ﬁscal consolidation measure.
Figure 7 shows that at relatively low levels of initial debt, i.i.d. tax and government
spending consolidations provide upper and lower bounds for the same-sized consolidations
of a known duration. Not knowing the duration of the consolidation limits the inﬂation-
10The spike in inﬂation expectations upon exiting from the consolidation reﬂects the fact that economic
agents are expecting a deﬂationary consolidation in the no-consolidation base case, while in the period
following a realized consolidation they know that no consolidation will take place for at least one period.
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ary (deﬂationary) response to the tax (spending)-based ﬁscal consolidation which, in turn,
aﬀects the extent to which monetary policy raises (reduces) real interest rates during the
consolidation. In contrast, at high-debt levels, tax-based consolidations of known duration
outperform those of uncertain duration, while government spending-based consolidations
perform in a similar way regardless of the duration uncertainty. The expansionary eﬀect
from rsτ is due to the fact that the tax increase today reduces the need for future tax in-
creases, which would otherwise have negative eﬀects on current debt service costs and the
tax base. This is consistent with the expectation eﬀects highlighted in the simple model of
section 3.
8 Fiscal Consolidation: Time and Composition Uncertainty
In practice, ﬁscal consolidations are uncertain both in their timing and their composition.
We now consider the two sources of uncertainty jointly using the policy rules sketched in
section 5.2. Consolidation intercepts, mτt and m
g
t , depend on the state variable rst, such
that whenever the level of government liabilities exceeds the stochastic ﬁscal limit, a ﬁscal
consolidation is triggered and lasts for one year, which involves tax increases with probability
ω, and government spending cuts with probability (1− ω). We calibrate the consolidations
as mτ = 0.01 and mg = 0.01y, which delivers tax- and spending-based consolidations of 1
percent of GDP.
8.1 Benchmark Case: ω = 0.75 and α = 1.5 In line with the AA data, the probability
ω is calibrate to 0.75, implying that the probability of a tax-based consolidation is three-
times that of a government spending-based consolidation. Setting α = 1.5 makes monetary
policy actively combat inﬂation in the manner that Taylor (1993) suggests.
Figure 8 compares the impulse responses for the two types of consolidations when the
initial probability of ﬁscal consolidation is low. There are few expectation eﬀects beyond the
fact that when a consolidation occurs, economic agents know it will last for one year. If the
ﬁscal consolidation turns out to be tax-based, the impulse responses are very similar to those
observed when tax-based consolidations are the only possible type [ﬁgure 2]. Similarly, when
the consolidation is essentially unexpected, if the realized consolidation cuts government
spending, then the impulse responses are very similar to the outcomes of consolidations when
spending is the only possible type [ﬁgure 5]. When the probability of ﬁscal consolidation is
low, economic agents do not expect there to be a consolidation of any kind, so uncertainty
over the type is not important.
In ﬁgure 9, government debt is high and agents believe a ﬁscal consolidation is imminent.
Now uncertainty over which type of consolidation will be realized starts to matter. Agents
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place 0.75 probability on tax increases, anchoring their expectations on inﬂationary increases
in distortionary taxation when the consolidation begins. If a spending-based consolidation
occurs, it surprises agents and reduces inﬂation relative to the no-consolidation case, which
incorporates expectations of predominately tax-based consolidations even though they are
not realized. The deﬂationary government spending-based consolidation, together with ac-
tive monetary policy, reduces real interest rates, raising the tax base and reducing debt
service costs. Consumption rises signiﬁcantly from realizing the government spending con-
solidation when households were worried that the consolidation would be tax-based. Real
wages rise relative to the no-consolidation case, though they would have fallen if there were
no composition uncertainty and all consolidations were spending-based.
When the realized consolidations are of the tax-based type, the results are qualitatively
similar to those seen when all consolidations are tax-based without any composition uncer-
tainty, since these were largely anticipated. Higher distortionary tax rates during the ﬁscal
consolidation raise marginal costs and inﬂation during the course of the consolidation. Ac-
tive monetary policy responds to the higher inﬂation by raising real interest rates, which
diminishes the tax base and raises debt service costs. This accounts for the relatively poor
performance of the tax-based consolidations in stabilizing debt when debt levels are high,
even although both tax and spending based consolidations have roughly the same impact on
the primary deﬁcit.
Figure 10 compares the output multiplier under tax- and spending-based consolidations
when the type of consolidation is uncertain, and tax increase and spending cuts in the no-RS
model. At low levels of debt, the two types of no-RS ﬁscal consolidations provide bounds
for the regime-switching model, similar to the comparison with only time uncertainty in
ﬁgure 7. When debt levels are high, spending-based consolidations in the regime-switching
model with composition uncertainty signiﬁcantly outperform the same-sized consolidations
in no-RS model. On the other hand, tax-based consolidations in the model with composition
uncertainty are very similar to tax increases applied in no-RS model. This is due to the ex-
pectation spill-over eﬀect, as explained in the analytical model in section 3. When economic
agents fear that a consolidation is imminent and are expecting it to be tax-based, they are
relieved to ﬁnd that the consolidation eﬀort is spending-based. While the spending cuts do
not lead to an immediate increase in output, they signiﬁcantly reduces their short-run costs
and raises the medium- to long-term beneﬁts.
If there were never any fear of a consolidation being tax-based, these expectational eﬀects
would not apply and the discounted output multiplier from a spending-based consolidation
would always be negative. In contrast, when the realized consolidation is tax-based, but there
was some possibility that it could be spending-based, the output costs of the consolidation
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rise. As we shall now see, this ranking could be diﬀerent depending on the monetary policy
stance (via α) and economic agents’ expectations about the likely composition of any ﬁscal
consolidation (via ω).
8.2 Monetary Policy and the Household’s Expectation of Consolidation
8.2.1 Less Active Monetary Policy In ﬁgure 9, deﬂationary spending cuts facilitate
relaxing monetary policy, which helps stabilize debt through its impact on the tax base and
debt service costs. But when monetary policy responds to the higher inﬂation generated by
tax-based consolidations, it raises the interest rates on government debt, which is particularly
destabilizing when debt levels are high. This reasoning suggests that the responsiveness of
monetary policy to inﬂation is critical in determining the relative eﬃcacy of the alternative
types of ﬁscal consolidation. At the initial debt level of 160 percent of GDP, ﬁgure 11 shows
the impulse responses across the two types of ﬁscal consolidation where monetary policy is
less active (α = 1.2) relative to the benchmark of α = 1.5 considered in ﬁgure 9.
Contrasting the two ﬁgures, reducing the responsiveness of interest rates to inﬂation deep-
ens the recession under government spending-based consolidations, and reduces its ability
to stabilize debt. In contrast, tax-based consolidations are no longer thwarted by monetary
policy: in fact, there is a more pronounced decline in debt following the tax-based consolida-
tion when monetary policy is less active. Nevertheless, spending-based consolidations remain
relatively more eﬀective in reducing the debt burden, and this relative eﬃcacy at high debt
levels is likely to exist as long as monetary policy is active.
Figure 12 repeats ﬁgure 10, but with the less-active monetary policy. Tax increases
become more expansionary, as the output multiplier turns to positive upon the exit of ﬁscal
consolidation, while spending cuts are much more contractionary. In an environment when
nominal interest rates are close to, or at, the zero lower bound, we are far more likely to
observe economic expansions following tax-based than spending-based consolidations.
8.2.2 Lower Probability of Tax-Based Consolidation In our ﬁnal experiment,
we return to our benchmark monetary policy of α = 1.5, but reverse the relative likeli-
hood of tax- and spending-based consolidations by setting ω = 0.25. Spending cuts are
three-times more likely than tax increases. As before, at low-debt levels this reversal makes
negligible diﬀerence since neither kind of consolidations is expected. At high-debt levels,
however, consolidations are thought to be imminent and it matters which type of consoli-
dation economic agents anticipate will occur. When we reverse the relative probabilities of
tax- and spending-based consolidations, economic agents believe the consolidations will lead
to deﬂationary cuts in government spending.
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As shown in ﬁgure 13, when the relatively low probability tax-based consolidation is
realized, inﬂation rises relative to the no-consolidation case and monetary policy responds by
raising real interest rates, reducing the tax base and fueling debt service costs. Government
debt rises relative to the no-consolidation case, undermining the stabilizing eﬀects in ﬁgure
9. Spending-based consolidations remain relatively eﬀective in stabilizing debt, but become
less expansionary than those observed in ﬁgure 9.
9 Summary
In this paper, we have explored the non-linearities inherent in state-dependent ﬁscal consoli-
dations. The exact timing of these consolidations is uncertain, but the likelihood of observing
a consolidation is rising as debt levels rise. In line with the data, we have contrasted tax-
based consolidations with spending-based ones in a variety of contexts, including low- and
high-debt levels, diﬀerent degrees of monetary policy activism, and diﬀerent beliefs about fu-
ture consolidations. Our results show that there are signiﬁcant interactions between all these
factors in determining the marginal impact of a given ﬁscal consolidation. For example, both
tax- and spending-based consolidations can be equally successful in stabilizing government
debt at low debt levels; nevertheless, the response to the same policies can be quite diﬀerent
at higher debt levels when ﬁscal consolidations are thought to be imminent. In particular,
the monetary policy response to the consolidation and any inﬂation it generates, along with
expectations over the composition of consolidations, are important factors in determining the
outcome. Undertaking a spending-based consolidation is more likely to have an expansionary
eﬀect on the economy when economic agents were anticipating a taxed-based consolidation,
especially when monetary policy is actively targeting inﬂation.
In terms of the key policy implications of our analysis, we can draw two main conclusions.
Firstly, the possibility of “expansionary” ﬁscal consolidations is driven by the resolution
of uncertainty associated with the composition and timing of the eventual consolidations.
Because the possibility of consolidation can act as a drag on economic activity, governments
can enhance economic growth by removing the uncertainty as early as possible, even if doing
so reduces the likelihood of observing an “expansionary” ﬁscal consolidation subsequently. In
the context of our model, “expansionary” ﬁscal consolidations are unlikely to be something
that governments seek, but instead reﬂect a failure to rule out growth-reducing policy options
sooner.
Secondly, our analysis also suggests that the inﬂationary consequences of alternative ﬁs-
cal instruments and the monetary policy response to that inﬂation are very important in
determining the outcomes, since debt service costs are a crucial aspect of debt dynamics at
high debt levels. Tax- and spending-based consolidations are fundamentally diﬀerent in their
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inﬂation consequences, since distortionary taxation raises marginal costs and fuels inﬂation
in a sticky-price economy, while government spending cuts are typically deﬂationary. These
diﬀerent inﬂation responses to debt service costs then depend on the monetary policy re-
sponse to inﬂation. Attempting a ﬁscal consolidation in an environment where interest rates
have reached their zero lower bound, is potentially quite diﬀerent from doing so when mon-
etary policy is facing an inﬂationary threat. Future research will attempt to assess whether
such factors alter the optimal composition of ﬁscal consolidations, since, for example, the in-
ﬂationary consequences of anticipated tax increases may actually be welcomed in a zero lower
bound environment. More generally, we shall seek to determine the optimal combination of
monetary and ﬁscal policies needed to implement successful ﬁscal consolidations.
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A Simulating the Fiscal Limit
Assume the utility function is u(ct, nt) = log ct+χN log(1−nt). Assuming the inﬂation rate
is its steady-state level, labor supply can be solved analytically as a function of (τt, At, gt)
using the ﬁrst-order conditions.
nt =
wt(1− τt) + χngt
wt(1− τt) + χnAt (A.1)
where wt = (θ− 1)/θAt. The total tax revenue is Tt = (wtnt +Υt) τt, and the peak of Laﬀer
curve, τmaxt , can be solved as,
τmax(At, gt) = 1 + χn
At
wt
−
√
χn(wt + χnAt)(At − gt)
wt
(A.2)
The ﬁscal limit B∗ can be obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation:
1. First, for each simulation, we randomly draw the shocks of government purchases,
and transfers for 1500 periods. Assuming that the tax rate is always at the peak
of the dynamic Laﬀer curves, we compute the paths of all other variables using the
household ﬁrst-order conditions and the budget constraints. According to equation 38,
we compute the discounted sum of maximum ﬁscal surplus by discarding the ﬁrst 500
draws as a burn-in period.
2. Second, we repeat the simulation for 100, 000 times and obtain the distribution of the
ﬁscal limit, which is then approximated through kernel density estimation.
3. At each period of time, the eﬀective ﬁscal limit b∗t is a random draw from the distri-
bution.
B Data Appendix
The ﬁscal data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 84 (2009) for the period between
1971 and 2009. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
The average tax rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the total tax revenue over GDP, including
social security, indirect and direct taxes. The government purchases are government ﬁnal
consumption of expenditures. Lump-sum transfers are deﬁned as the sum of social security
payments, net capital transfers and subsidies.
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C Solving the Nonlinear Model
The decision rules for government debt bt = f
b(ψt), real wage wt = f
w(ψt) and inﬂation rate
πt = f
π(ψt), are solved in the following steps:
1. Discretize the state space ψt = {bt−1, gt, zt, τt, rst, rszt} with grid points of nb = 25, ng =
5, nz = 5, nτ = 11, nrs = 9, nrsz = 2. Make an initial guess of the decision rules(
f b0 , f
w
0 , f
π
0
)
over the state space.
2. At each grid point, solve the model and obtain the updated rule
(
f bi , f
w
i , f
π
i
)
using
the given rule
(
f bi−1, f
w
i−1, f
π
i−1
)
. Other than the monetary and ﬁscal policy rules, the
optimization equations can be summarized,
1
Rt
= βEt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
1
πt+1
(C.1)
−un(t)
uc(t)
= wt (1− τt) (C.2)
ct +
bt
Rt
=
bt−1
πt
+ (1− τt) (wtnt +Υt) + zt (C.3)
ct + gt = Atnt
(
1− φ
2
(πt
π
− 1
)2)
(C.4)
(1− θ) + θmct = φ
(πt
π
− 1
) πt
π
− βφEtuc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
(πt+1
π
− 1
) πt+1
π
yt+1
yt
(C.5)
The integrals implied by the expectations terms on the right-hand side are evaluated
using numerical quadratures.
3. Check convergence of the decision rules. If |f bi − f bi−1| or |fwi − fwi−1| or |fπi − fπi−1| is
above the desired tolerance (set to 1e− 5), go back to step 2; otherwise, f bi , fwi and fπi
are the decision rules.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Fiscal Limit
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Figure 2: Impulse Response: no-RS vs. rsτ model (initial probability of consolidation = 0.08)
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Figure 3: Impulse Response: no-RS vs. rsτ model (initial probability of consolidation = 0.82)
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Figure 4: Inﬂation dynamics in the rsτ model
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Figure 5: Impulse Response: no-RS vs. rsg model (initial probability of consolidation = 0.08)
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Figure 6: Impulse Response: no-RS vs. rsg model (initial probability of consolidation = 0.82)
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Figure 7: Output Multiplier: no-RS vs. rsτ vs. rsg model
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Figure 8: Impulse Response: RS model (initial probability of consolidation = 0.08)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Labor (N
t
)
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
Tax rate (
t
)
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
P
oi
nt
5 10 15 20 25 30
−2
−1
0
Bond (b
t−1
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Consumption (c
t
)
5 10 15 20 25
−1
0
1
Ex−post real interest rate (r
t
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1
2
Wage (w
t
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−4
−2
0
Government spending (g
t
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
0
1
Inflation (
t
)
 
 
−type
g−type
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Expected Inflation
Figure 9: Impulse Response: RS model (initial probability of consolidation = 0.82)
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Figure 10: Output Multiplier: no-RS vs. RS model
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Labor (N
t
)
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
Tax rate (
t
)
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
P
oi
nt
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Bond (b
t−1
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Consumption (c
t
)
5 10 15 20 25
−1
0
1
Ex−post real interest rate (r
t
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1
2
Wage (w
t
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−4
−2
0
Government spending (g
t
)
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
0
1
Inflation (
t
)
 
 
−type
g−type
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Expected Inflation
Figure 11: Impulse Response under less active monetary policy: RS model (initial probability
of consolidation = 0.82) with α = 1.2
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Figure 12: Output Multiplier: no-RS vs. RS model with less active monetary policy
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Figure 13: Impulse Response under ω = 0.25: RS model (initial probability of consolidation
= 0.82)
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Expansionary Contractionary
Debt
−4.93∗
(1.69)
5.42∗
(1.41)
Change in Debt
−0.54
(1.21)
−2.22∗
(0.53)
Total Deﬁcit
−3.05∗
(0.52)
−1.56∗
(0.33)
Primary Deﬁcit
−2.54∗
(0.58)
−1.91∗
(0.31)
Primary Expenditures
−2.19∗
(0.65)
−0.80∗
(0.34)
Transfers
−0.58
(0.41)
0.47∗
(0.17)
Govt Wage Exp.
−0.40∗
(0.17)
−0.40∗
(0.13)
Govt non-Wage Exp.
−0.13
(0.12)
0.14
(0.08)
Subsidies
−0.32∗
(0.11)
−0.16∗
(0.05)
Govt Investment
−0.76∗
(0.25)
−0.83∗
(0.15)
Total Rev
0.35
(0.42)
1.11∗
(0.24)
Income Tax
0.16
(0.33)
0.27
(0.17)
Business Tax
0.81∗
(0.36)
0.39∗
(0.14)
Indirect Tax
0.01
(0.15)
0.27∗
(0.12)
Soc. Sec, Contributions
−0.06
(0.22)
0.14
(0.13)
Table 1: Expansionary and contractionary ﬁscal consolidations in AA data (size and compo-
sition): ∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, all variables are the average
changes in the variable relative to GDP in the two years preceeding and following a ﬁscal
consolidation. The standard errors are in brackets.
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Parameter Calibration
Discount factor β 0.99
Elasticity of substitution θ 11
Rotemberg adjustment parameter φ 100
Inﬂation rate π 1.03 (annual)
Technology A 1
Labor supply n 0.25
Government spending-GDP g/y 0.21
Government transfer-GDP z/y 0.18
Government debt-GDP b/y 0.50 (annual)
Tax rate τ 0.41
Fiscal rule parameter γτ 0.5/4
Taylor rule parameter α 1.5
Political factor βp 0.85
Spending shock persistence ρg 0.9
Spending shock variance σ2g (0.005g)
2
Transfer persistence ρz 0.9
ζz 1.003
Transfer regime parameter pz 0.975
Transfer shock variance σ2z (0.005z)
2
Length of consolidations h 4
Tax-type consolidation mτ 0.01
Spending-type consolidation mg 0.01y
Probability of tax-type FC ω 0.75
Table 2: Model Calibration
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